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I. INTRODUCTION
Campaigns within Congress to curb the domestic reach of the
Arab boycott of Israel go back over a decade. Such efforts became
intense from 1975 to 1977, as petrodollars mounted and gave the
boycott a new power. The advocates of legislation aroused a deter-
mined opposition within the executive branch and the business
community. Hard battles followed between branches of government
and between private interest groups. Eventually those battles gave
way to innovative bargaining arrangements between the private in-
terests, which produced acceptable compromises. Such compro-
mises figure prominently in the antiboycott provisions of the Export
Administration Amendments of 1977,' and the implementing regu-
lations of the Commerce Department which became effective in
January 1978.2
The legislative record is dotted with assertions of the singularly
abrasive character of these battles. But the campaign for federal
legislation was probably no rougher than those aiming at other con-
tentious programs. The final votes were in fact overwhelming, 3 and
thus far the battles have left few casualties.
Still the three-year drive for strong checks on American participa-
tion in the boycott engages the interest of the political observer. It
is upon these political phenomena rather than a systematic legal
analysis of the statute that this Article dwells. I draw only selec-
tively and illustratively upon the provisions of the 1977 amend-
ments and 1978 regulations.
My observations about the politics of the antiboycott legislation
concentrate upon three themes with a common element that speaks
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A., 1951; M.A., LL.B., Harvard University,
1955.
' Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977)
thereinafter referred to as EAA] amending the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2401, et seq. (1970) (amended 1974).
2 Export Administration Regulations on Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts
thereinafter cited as EAR], 43 Fed. Reg. 3508-37 (1978).
See note 77 infra.
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to a salient contemporary feature of the political process. The
shared element is the prominence of interest-group politics-that is,
the degree to which the origin or fate of major legislative proposals
depends upon well organized groups that are knowledgeable, effec-
tive and committed to (or committed to oppose) the proposal. Their
decisions to fight or yield will strongly influence the timing and
content (or collapse) of legislation. These private groups interact
complexly with the White House, executive departments and the
Congress, as well as each other. They may assume a quasi-official
role in the formal political-legislative process through the respect
and close attention shown them by the Executive and Congress.
They may in fact be enlisted by one or another branch of govern-
ment to find between themselves a solution. All such phenomena
here occurred.
In the boycott context, the two dominant groups were three Jew-
ish agencies-the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the
American Jewish Committee, and the American Jewish Con-
gress-which acted cooperatively in fighting for antiboycott legisla-
tion, and a variety of business associations-most prominently the
Business Roundtable-which opposed or sought to weaken the anti-
boycott bills. A third group, not directly before the Congress and of
course not subject to any proposed regulation, also exerted a power-
ful influence on the final terms of the legislation-the Arab states
whose boycott was under attack. Their cause and the justification
for their boycott were argued principally by the business interests,
just as the Jewish agencies spoke to concerns not only of the Ameri-
can Jewish community but also of Israel. Interest group politics here
had a distinctive international flavor.
My first theme examines the arguments made before and within
the Congress for and against legislation. Did different types of argu-
ment characterize the interest groups advocating or opposing strict
legislation? Did these arguments exert a force independent of the
force of the groups advancing them? That is, did they to some extent
stand above their interest-group authors and play some autonomous
role in influencing the outcome?
A second theme treats the changing position and role of the Exec-
utive after President Carter's election. What forces led to that
change, and how did it influence the terms of the legislation? How
did the executive branch respond to the threefold pressures upon it
from business groups, the Jewish agencies and the Arab
governments?
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The final theme concerns the decisive, perhaps unique role, which
the leading Jewish agencies and the Business Roundtable played in
the final months. Does that role suggest a changing pattern for
interest group conflict and accommodation over legislative
measures? A closing section develops earlier observations while
speculating about the effects of the legislation upon the boycott and
our relations with Arab countries.
In developing these themes, I draw not only upon the official
record of hearings and debates, to which most notes will refer, but
also upon a more vivid and personal sense of the events of these
years. My discussions with a number of executive officials, Con-
gressmen and representatives of interest groups in 1976 and 1978
contributed to that sense, as did the rich periodical coverage of these
events.
II. SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A barebone description of draft bills and the final legislation will
be useful to the later discussion. The 94th Congress debated two
basic antiboycott bills in its second (1976) session. The Senate (Ste-
venson) bill' tightened reporting requirements for business firms;
prohibited the furnishing of information sought for purposes of boy-
cott enforcement that concerned a person's religion, race or national
origin; and prohibited the refusal by American firms to do business
with other American firms because of requirements of foreign boy-
cotts. It easily passed the Senate.
The House (Bingham-Rosenthal) bill5 was more severe. It covered
the preceding ground but also imposed penalties on firms that took
action "with intent to comply with or to further or support any trade
boycott" fostered by a foreign country against a friendly foreign
country. The prohibited action included the furnishing of any
boycott-related information, as well as a refusal to do business with
the boycotted country, its firms or American firms because of the
boycott. The bill did not include the important exceptions and qual-
ifications to these restrictions which became so vital a feature of the
1977 legislation. The 94th Congress ended after passage of the Sen-
ate and House bills but before differences between the two could be
resolved.'
Title II of S. 3084, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
Section 14 of H.R. 15377, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
See note 57 infra.
19781
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The 1977 legislation, after broadly prohibiting action "with intent
to comply" with foreign boycotts'-prohibitions covering much the
same ground as those in the Bingham-Rosenthal bill-provides
important exceptions. Two central exceptions figure in the following
discussion: (1) compliance by a United States firm with the
"unilateral" selection by the boycotting country or its nationals or
residents (including subsidiaries of United States firms located
there) of suppliers of services to be performed in the boycotting
country, and of suppliers of specific goods normally identifiable by
source (as if trade-marked) when imported into the boycotting
country;8 and (2) compliance by subsidiaries of United States firms
resident in a foreign country with the laws of that country with
respect to a subsidiary's local activities, including laws governing
the import of identifiable products for its own use.' As interpreted
by the regulations of the Commerce Department, 0 these and related
exceptions have the effect of permitting American corporations to
continue to do business with Arab customers that to some degree is
explicitly shaped by boycott rules. They have particular relevance
to the large multinational companies, those engaged in subcontract-
ing and owning foreign subsidiaries.
My comments on the legislation and its political setting treat only
marginally the primary Arab boycott of Israel-that is, bans by
Arab countries of trade with or investments in Israel. The primary
boycott was barely touched by the new laws. The real battles were
over the secondary boycott-that is, the effort of the Arabs to enlist
third-country firms in the boycott of Israel by refusing to purchase
goods or services from them if they engaged in proscribed commer-
cial relations with Israel (and were therefore blacklisted). I include
within this concept of secondary boycott, its extended form (some-
times referred to as a tertiary boycott): the refusal of Arab custom-
ers to purchase goods from a third-country firm acting consistently
with the boycott if those goods include components made by a
blacklisted firm." The only third country figuring in my discussion
is the United States.
7 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1).
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(C).
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F).
10 EAR § 369.3, 43 Fed. Reg. 3525-34 (1978).
1 In an earlier article, I described the anatomy of the Arab boycott and distinguished
among its four basic forms with their different degrees of penetration of our domestic order:
the core and extended primary boycott, and the core and extended secondary boycott. See
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III. THE CONGRESSIONAL CONTEXT: PRESSURES, PRINCIPLES AND
PREDICTIONS
The one-sided votes for antiboycott legislation in the 94th and
95th Congress have no simple explanation. That some measure
would emerge became clear by mid-1976, partly because of a grow-
ing number of state antiboycott statutes. 2 The forces behind the
state laws had sought in part to spur federal action. They succeeded.
The confusing diversity of state laws and their interstate or foreign
reach led to pressures for federal preemption and a uniform rule.
At the federal level, the organized and documented programs of
the Jewish agencies played a vital role. One or another of these
groups amassed, analyzed and distributed information about the
boycott, argued for legislation in publications and in testimony be-
fore Congress, brought law suits, and exerted a continuing pressure
on Congressmen, executive agencies and key multinational corpora-
tions."
Behind such front-line agencies stood a Jewish population whose
concern mounted over the secondary boycott's success. That success
appeared to pose threats ranging from subtle and indirect forms of
religious discrimination in corporate practices, to the imprinting
upon the American economy of systematic discrimination against
Israel. Concerns about the boycott reached Congress from these
electoral constituencies as well as from the Jewish agencies. Such
electoral politics played its role, although Senate and House support
for the legislation was so geographically widespread as to discredit
any explanation based dominantly on congressional response to
concrete pressures of local Jewish groups.
Congress also felt powerful counterpressures, not only from busi-
ness interests but from the Ford, and to a lesser degree, Carter
Administrations. Corporate residents of congressional districts
clearly influenced their representatives. Arab governments and
Arab businesses made their views known to the Administration and
to the multinational firms with which they dealt. Such views made
their way to the Congress. But no more readily can the opposition
Steiner, International Boycotts and Domestic Order: American Involvement in the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, 54 TEX. L. REv. 1355, 1367-69 (1976).
" See, e.g., Illinois Blacklist Trade Law §§ 1-6, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 29, §§ 91-96 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1976-1977); Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 296, 298-a (McKinney Supp.
1975-1976).
'3 See Maslow, The Struggle Against the Arab Boycott, MIDSTREAM, Aug./Sept. 1977, at 11.
19781 533
GA.. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
to strict legislation be understood simply as a response to these polar
forces.
The essential role of the private groups was to heighten aware-
ness, inform legislators and the public about the historical experi-
ence with the boycott, predict the effects of new regulation, and
advance arguments for or against legislation based on such facts or
predictions. No doubt these arguments served an instrumental and
ideological function. They captured the interests of the different
groups in an objective, non-self-interested form. They were meant
to generalize the grounds for the groups' claims on the legislature
and thereby to attract support from broader constituencies.
But to note their ideological and self-interested character is to
point only to one aspect of their role. The leading arguments before
the Congress cannot be fused completely with the groups generating
them, and thereby reduced to camouflaged group interests. They
stood to an important degree on their own. Their link to traditional
principles in American politics and to accepted national goals gave
them independent claims for attention-a certain autonomy.
It is such arguments that I now examine. Broadly speaking, the
arguments for or against strict legislation fall into two distinct pat-
terns. The proponents of forceful action tended to argue from two
general principles. One was basically moral in character-the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination. The other expressed a basic political
concept-the principle of territorial sovereignty. In contrast, the
opponents of strict legislation tended to stress the likely negative
effects of legislation upon economic life-export trade and related
jobs, oil prices and the petrodollar holdings of government debt-as
well as upon our influence for any Middle Eastern settlement.
The distinction here intended between the two types of argument
is not solely between rights-based or "principled" arguments for
antiboycott legislation, and instrumental or utilitarian arguments
stressing the dangerous consequences of legislation for some welfare
goal. The two sides did tend towards one or the other style of argu-
ment, but these were only tendencies. For example, advocates
sought ways to lessen the risk that legislation would drive away
Arab business; opponents sought to limit the foreign reach of any
United States legislation by drawing on the principle of territorial
sovereignty. Nor is the distinction solely between a stress on vindi-
cation of principle and stress on consequences. Both sides were at-
tentive to consequences, whether those stemming from the surren-
der or compromise of a given principle or those stemming from
legislation that might provoke retaliation.
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Rather the root distinction that I here intend is between the dif-
ferent kinds of values or interests stressed in the arguments of the
two sides. Through their two principles, proponents invoked tradi-
tional values that spoke to a moral sense or to basic political beliefs.
Opponents stressed more tangible and material goals. Indeed, their
focus upon material consequences proved in the end to be a major
weakness in the bid to forestall legislation. The predictions were
shaky, contentious and not widely believed.
A. The Advocates of Strong Legislation
It was politically strategic for proponents of legislation to stress
arguments portraying the boycott as encouraging anti-Jewish dis-
crimination by American business. To the extent accurate, that
portrait assured governmental countermeasures. Business and other
groups could hardly contest the need to curb domestic discrimina-
tion.' 4 This was common ground, partly covered by existing statutes
and regulations.
Where opinion differed was over the accuracy of this view.' 5 To
stress religious discrimination was to bypass the complex questions
posed by other, unrelated secondary boycott practices. Instances of
discrimination were rare.'" Of course, the boycott might have fos-
,1 Numerous Congressmen commented on the issue of discrimination. See, e.g., the re-
marks of Senator Stevenson that the boycott "interferes with basic human rights and reli-
gious freedom." Arab Boycott, Hearings to Amend and Extend the Export Administration
Act Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Senate
Hearings]. The spokesmen for business interests appearing before congressional committees
took pains to recognize the need for legislation checking any trend towards religious discrimi-
nation in employment or the selection of business customers. See, e.g., Hearings on Extension
of the Export Administration Act of 1969 Before the House Comm. on International Relations,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 130, 137 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Hearings]; 1977 Senate
Hearings, supra, at 101, 335. But, as indicated in note 15 infra, they found no such discrimina-
tory intent in the boycott.
" See, e.g., the statement of Robert McNeill, Executive Vice Chairman of the Emergency
Committee for American Trade, which argued that legislation should "deal with foreign
boycotts as they are and not as some describe them to be." The Arab boycott, he stated,
involved not religious but political discrimination, and a trivial number of boycott-related
requests involved religious discrimination. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 137.
,I Some questionnaires and certifications reached beyond inquiry into an American firm's
relations with Israel to inquiry into the identity of persons related to the firm, or personal
information about such persons. For illustrations, see SuBCOMM. ON OvERsIrr AND INvESTIGA-
TIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SEs., REPORT ON THE ARAB
BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS 33-34, 38-39 (Subcomm. Print 1976); Foreign Investment
and Arab Boycott Legislation, Hearings on S. 425, Amend. No. 24 Thereto: S. 953, S. 995, &
S. 1303, Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70, 188-89 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
1978]
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tered open, flagrant religious discrimination if its authors had not
been made aware of the public hostility to any such effort. Through
a series of underwriting episodes in 1975 in Europe and this country
involving Arab capital and religious discrimination, it had become
evident to Arab countries that discriminatory policies would back-
fire.'
But in a less tangible sense that escapes hard documentation, the
boycott was instinct with subtle pressures towards religious discrim-
ination. For example, boycott regulations proscribed transactions
with Zionists or Zionist-controlled firms.'" Such rules inevitably
raised questions about the relationship between Zionists and Jews,
and about the feasibility of drawing a sharp and administrable dis-
tinction. Firms courting petrodollar trade might expediently avoid
commercial relations with Jewish lawyers or bankers, or hesitate to
appoint Jews to prominent executive positions. Moreover, the visa
Stevenson Hearings]. A survey as of 1976 indicated that of 50,000 transactions involving
boycott requests which firms had reported to the Department of Commerce, only 25 involved
religious discrimination. Hearings on Discriminatory Arab Pressure on U.S. Business Before
the Subcomm. on International Trade and Commerce of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bingham Hearings]. See also
Hearings on Contempt Proceedings Against Secretary of Commerce, Rogers C. B. Morton,
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-95, 21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Moss
Hearings]. At times, the State Department succeeded in terminating efforts at religious
discrimination that were referred to it by the Commerce Department through diplomatic
negotiations with the Arab country involved. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 24, 1975, at 3, cols.
2-3.
Indeed, the rarity of internal religious discrimination was demonstrated through the testi-
mony of Maxwell Greenberg, chairman of the National Executive Committee of the Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. An analysis which he submitted indicated that religious
discrimination figured in only 3 of 836 reports filed with the Commerce Department since
October 1976, and those three were related primarily to the negative certificate of origin.
There were no requests in this sample for information about ownership or control of compa-
nies by Jews or whether officers or directors were Jews. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note
14, at 240-42.
" For'accounts of the underwriting episodes, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1975, at 43, col. 3;
id., Feb. 24, 1975, at 39, col. 7. For indications of the growing pressure for action following
such episodes, see letters and complaints set forth in Stevenson Hearings, supra note 16, at
201-77. See President's Statement on Foreign Boycott Practices of Nov. 20, 1975, 11 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1305, 1306 (Nov. 24, 1975).
'" See the provisions in League of Arab Countries, General Secretariate, Head Office for
the Boycott of Israel, General Principles for Boycott of Israel, June 1972 (State Department
translation of a summary of the boycott rules and the full text of resolutions), reprinted in
Hearings on Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy Before the Sub-
comm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 11, 442-76 (1975). The resolutions treating "Zionist Sympathizers" or "Zionism"
or corporations that may be characterized as "Zionist sympathizers" appear in id. at 453-58
and 466.
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policies of countries such as Saudi Arabia went beyond anti-Israeli
measures to exclude Jews of any nationality. Those policies had
involved our government in the discriminatory selection of Ameri-
cans for service in that country.'9
A secondary boycott against Israel thus posed a risk of discrimina-
tion against a body of American citizens, a risk that would not have
been presented by a boycott against a country like Pakistan with no
related American population. The principle of non-discrimination
had a genuine and not contrived bearing on legislation.
The principle reached beyond religious discrimination to figure
within the recurring free-trade arguments against the boycott. 0 It
is, of course, easy to expose the contradictions in the invocation of
that economic objective. Our own regulatory schemes offer telling
illustrations of departures from free-trade norms, ranging from tar-
iffs or quotas or price supports to restrictions on monetary or invest-
ment flows. Moreover, our specific boycott regulations as well as our
general export controls explicitly discriminate among nations.2 '
Still the secondary boycott against Israel embraced other territo-
ries with an inclusiveness that this country had rarely attempted.2
For our government to discriminate in trade or investment in our
perceived national interest was one matter. For our economy to
,1 In the President's Statement on Foreign Boycott Practices of Nov. 20, 1975, supra note
17, President Ford referred to these practices and prohibited federal agencies from considering
the exclusionary policies of a host country when making overseas assignments.
" See, e.g., the remarks of Senator Proxmire objecting to Arab efforts to "dictate" the
directions of trade to American firms. "We believe that quality and price should be the
ultimate arbiter in the marketplace both in our domestic and foreign commerce." 1977 Senate
Hearings, supra note 14, at 2. "[llnstead of being fearful of Arab retribution," this country
should use all efforts to assure "that all of our trade is conducted in accordance with free
market principles." Id. at 3. This free-trade rhetoric was joined in by spokesmen for business
interests, if only to deplore boycotts in general while urging caution in any restrictive regula-
tion of the Arab boycott. See the statement of the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM), noting the NAM's support of government policy to eliminate international boy-
cotts "which serve to distort market-oriented trade and investment flows." Id. at 334. Still
diplomacy was the path to be preferred over legislation.
In his comments upon the signing of the antiboycott legislation, President Carter stated
that "the issue also goes to the very heart of free trade among all nations." 13 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PRES. Doc. 898 (June 27, 1977).
11 The legislative bases for our own boycotts and export regulations are principally section
5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and
the Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (codified at
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13) (1970 & Supp. V 1975)(expired 1976), as extended and amended
by EAA, supra note 1. The boycott and export restrictions under this legislation are described
in Steiner, supra note 11, at 1358-62.
22 Steiner, supra note 11, at 1362-70, 1396-97.
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express the discriminatory design of foreign governments was an-
other. Moreover, whatever our departures from it, the principle of
non-discrimination in trade has remained an attractive ideal. Free-
trade arguments in the Congress may have been used instrumen-
tally to cover other motives for attacking the boycott. But their
prominence suggests that they carried some weight of their own.
As it merges into free-trade objectives, the non-discrimination
principle borders upon the second major principle in the legislative
arguments, that of territorial sovereignty.2 The secondary boycott,
a territorially aggressive policy, sought to absorb third-countries
into the boycotters' economic warfare against the target country. It
reached extraterritorially in an explicit way, leaving upon the third
country's territory a trail of questionnaires, certifications and letters
of credit with boycott-related conditions. That trail deepened and
broadened as annual petrodollar trade soared from millions to bil-
lions of dollars. A de jure Arab boycott on export of goods, capital
or technology to Israel threatened to become de facto our export ban
as well.
Seen from this second principle, Congress' action can be under-
stood to assert: if any government imposes a systematic boycott
scheme upon American industry, that government should be our
own. u As we shall see, after Carter's election, the force of this argu-
ment won even the Administration. 25
2 The common border of the two principles is suggested by remarks of Senator Heinz about
the secondary boycott. He referred to "the paramount moral issue" as whether this country
should comply with foreign discriminatory requests and the secondary boycott. 123 CONG.
REc. S.7151 (daily ed. May 5, 1977).
24 The legislative record contains numerous references to foreign interference with this
country's sovereignty. See, e.g., remarks of Senator Stevenson (the boycott "intrudes upon
American sovereignty") in 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 1; statement by the AFL-
CIO Executive Council on the Arab Boycott (the secondary boycott has "put at issue Amer-
ica's willingness to defend its own principles and sovereignty") id. at 505. See also REPORT
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1977, S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977
SENATE REPOwr. Enactment of the antiboycott bill means that "foreign nations would be
put on notice that the U.S. Government will not tolerate such interference with its sover-
eignty." Id. at 22. In urging a narrowly drawn exception for unilateral selection of goods or
services, the Report notes that this country should not tolerate foreign buyers' telling U.S.
vendors whom they can hire for general, unidentifiable goods or services. "Such dictation
reaches into the heart of U.S. internal affairs . .." Id. at 23.
' After his Middle Eastern trip, Secretary Vance stated that the Arabs' strong concern was
with our interference in the administration of the primary boycott. "They understood our
sensitivity over their secondary boycott practices and our right to regulate, through our laws,
the activities of our citizens." 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 437. Risk of loss of
trade would be reduced "if the Arabs see the legislation as dealing with the activities of
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In their general and abstract form these two principles provided
sturdy support for curbs on the secondary boycott. But one should
appreciate that the principles took on particular force because of the
precise national and political context to which they were applied.
We have noted the peculiar pertinence of the non-discrimination
principle when a secondary boycott aims at a target country with
which a part of the American population is linked by common reli-
gion, ethnic character or culture. Moreover, the boycott attempted
to absorb American business into a discriminatory scheme against
Israel, a country enjoying broad public sympathy as well as one
receiving our military and economic aid." The boycott could hardly
have touched more sensitive national nerves, or avoided the charge
of interfering with our territorial sovereignty.
That charge had particular appeal because of a general mood in
Congress. Since 1973, rising oil prices and the resulting petrodollars
contributed to domestic inflation and related economic problems,
and influenced our Middle Eastern policy. The secondary boycott
symbolized this new economic force, a force here exerted upon and
visible within our national territory. National pride or simply re-
sentment at oil politics can be sensed throughout the long legislative
history.27 At least in part, Congress said that petrodollar power had
its limits. The United States could still act to assert its territorial
sovereignty.
Viewing the two principles in this political context, the arguments
for legislation can be seen to involve four key elements: (1) a dis-
criminatory commercial practice; (2) such a practice against a for-
eign country to which the United States gave critical support and
to which a group of citizens was in some manner linked; (3) a prac-
tice authored by and serving the purposes of foreign governments;
and (4) a practice imposed on American territory and industry by
the bait of petrodollars. To these should be added a fifth element:
American firms rather than confronting their own policies and laws." Id. at 441.
" See, e.g., comment of Senator Williams that U.S. firms "have become enforcers of
pernicious and illegitimate practices against a close ally, Israel..." Id. at 3; and remarks
of Representative Whalen that Arab officials were showing greater "appreciation of American
objections to U.S. companies being used as a tool of un-American foreign policies." 1977
House Hearings, supra note 14, at 281.
" See, e.g., remarks of Senator Proxmire ("I do object to the Arab nations using their power
to dictate the terms of trade to American firms."), 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at
2; and remarks of Senator Williams (cannot allow "the threat of reprisal by the Arabs" to
permit compliance by American firms with requirements that "abridge this Nation's sover-
eign powers"), id. at 3.
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congressional resentment against the willing complicity of Ameri-
can business in the entire scheme, indeed the assumption by firms
of part of the burden of administering the boycott through letters
of credit or through furnishing boycott-related information."
The significance for congressional action of the combination of the
four major factors becomes the clearer through variations of the
historical facts. Had a secondary boycott been instituted, for exam-
ple, by India against Pakistan, it is doubtful whether a similar
legislative attack would have been mounted. Since the amount of
trade potentially affected would have been slight, the boycott would
not have left a deep mark upon our economy. Fewer and less threat-
ened domestic groups would have gathered energies to inform about
the boycott and militate for restrictions. Some complicity of private
industry with such a boycott would not have contradicted a basic
foreign-policy commitment to the target country.
B. Opponents of Strict Legislation
During the Ford Administration and to some extent that of
Carter, the executive branch opposed the pending bills. Business
was in opposition throughout. As the Executive moved in 1977 to-
wards acceptance of legislation that would be tamed by the two
exceptions and other limits, business interests mounted a more sys-
tematic and public attack. The most effective of these groups, the
Business Roundtable, played the vital role that is discussed in sec-
tion V of this Article. Here I examine the general position of in-
dustrial or business groups and of the Congressmen sympathetic to
them.
1. Predictions of Economic Loss
Business spokesmen advanced one basic argument consisting of
observations of fact and predictions of behavior. It had the following
"s See HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, REPORT ON EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES'
ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AND POLICIES AGAINST COMPLIANCE, BY BANKS AND OTHER U.S. FIRMS,
WITH THE ARAB BOYCOTT, H. REP. No. 1668, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-9 (1976). Chairman Burns
of the Federal Reserve Bank stated that "the U.S. bank in a real sense gives effect to the
boycott by agreeing to handle a letter of credit that embodies such terms." Letter from Arthur
Burns to Representative Benjamin Rosenthal (June 3, 1976), set forth in Hearings on Effec-
tiveness of Federal Agencies' Enforcement of Laws and Policies Against Compliance, by
Banks and Other U.S. Firms, With the Arab Boycott, Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1976). Senator Proxmire observed that the secondary boycott forced U.S.
firms to police and enforce the boycott and that banks "play a strong enforcement role." 123
CONG. Rc. S7150 (daily ed. May 5, 1977).
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elements: (a) With few exceptions, Arabs could purchase elsewhere
their present imports from the United States. This country held no
monopoly on technology which could block such trade diversion. (b)
Arabs will understand antiboycott legislation as an act of political
hostility and as an interference with their sovereignty. 9 (c) They
will retaliate by turning in pique to European or Japanese markets. 0
Hence antiboycott legislation "would effectively bar . . . virtually
all American companies from pursuing business opportunities" in
the Middle East.3" (d) The billions of dollars of trade that we stand
to lose will mean the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs, as well
as further irritation of our balance-of-payments problems. (e) Par-
ticularly at a time when we should "stimulate, not retard" exports,"2
antiboycott legislation makes no sense.
Such assertions were caught at their extreme in a political adver-
tisement sponsored by Dresser Industries and published as the final
votes on the antiboycott bills approached. 3 In it, an M.I.T. Profes-
sor of International Management advised that there were "500,000
jobs we will not have in the U.S." if restrictive laws were passed.
Surely, "even the most ardent Israeli supporters do not want their
activities to be identified with the loss of half a million American
jobs." The "anti-Semitic backlash" from such a consequence "could
be tragic."
These views found active endorsement from a few Congressmen.
Remarks were made in the House that "needless, punitive and dan-
gerous" legislation "would put in jeopardy billions of dollars of na-
tional income, 31 4 or that legislation would "beyond doubt" reduce
jobs.35
Congressmen supporting legislation readily conceded that there
might be some loss of trade .3 But many legislators viewed the ex-
29 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 77-78 (statement of William Needham).
Compare the testimony of Secretary of Commerce Morton described in note 56, infra,
with statements by spokesmen of business associations predicting such trade readjustments,
see 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 78; 1977 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 137-
38, 151.
3' Letter from Winzler & Kelly, Consulting Engineers, to Senator Cranston (Feb. 16, 1977),
1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 100.
2 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 151 (statement of Harold Morgan).
3 Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1977, at 24-25 (two full pages).
31 123 CONG. REC. H3274-75 (daily ed. April 20, 1977) (remarks of Representative Michel).
Id. at H3295 (remarks of Representative Findley). See also Representative Findley's
additional views in H. REP. No. 190, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS. AT 58 (1977) [hereinafter 1977
HOUSE REPORTI. The legislation would be "[alt best . . . a serious encumbrance" to United
States firms seeking Arab customers.
"' Senator Stevenson noted that legislation "could provide a loss of trade in the Middle
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treme claims of the business community with caution, or scorn. The
Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations re-
ferred to the message sponsored by Dresser Industries as "sheer
nonsense and the worst kind of scare tactics."37 Others expressed
scepticism over draconian predictions "which go far beyond what
the facts would justify."38 Indeed, predictions of trade loss, and the
threat from Arab countries which they implicitly carried, may have
strengthened in some Congressmen the determination to act. For
example, several observed that some trade loss could be a price well
paid for vindication of the principles supporting legislation.
2. The Problem with Predictions
Congress' scepticism was well founded. The political context in
which business spokesmen offered their dark prophecies was a dis-
tinctive one. It had characteristics which pointed towards a dis-
counting of the types of predictions that were made.
In more typical settings, legislators wrestle with the problem of
predicting behavioral responses to new legislation. Their estimates
of probabilities of one reaction or another will influence decisions
about such characteristic measures of the regulatory state as a penal
statute imposing a strict sentence, or a tax measure designed to spur
business investment or restrain environmental pollution. In reach-
ing decision, legislators will draw upon the reigning theories of caus-
East" but concluded that some loss was worth implementing "the principle of American
sovereignty." 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 156. Senator Proxmire, addressing the
fears of businessmen of trade diversion, stated that "I don't think we are as helpless as you
made us out to be and I disagree with your notion that we just should ignore the moral
elements." Id. at 160. "I realize that we are perhaps losing some commercial advantage." Id.
at 161. Representative Hamilton, arguing for legislation containing the basic exceptions,
noted that it "tries to disrupt U.S. trade as little as possible and, therefore, hold a minimum
to the shift of jobs and sales overseas." 1977 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 279. Represent-
ative Rosenthal observed: "I would be naive if I did not admit some risk" in the legislation.
But he noted "several grounds for optimism that any disruption of trade would be neither
severe nor long term." 1977 House Report, supra note 35, at 52.
123 CONG. REc. H3267 (daily ed. April 20, 1977)(remarks of Representative Zablocki).
1977 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 199(remarks of Representative Solarz). Repre-
sentative Bingham, noting that AFL-CIO support for the legislation suggested no expectation
of a substantial loss of jobs, observed that there was "no basis on which a precise estimate
can be made . . ." 123 CONG. REc. H3268 (daily ed. April 20, 1977). Chairman Zablocki of
the House Committee on International Relations noted the "judgment of the committee" that
"there could be some small job losses." Id. at H3267. There appear in the 1977 Senate
Hearings, supra note 14, at 263-272, 16 editorials supporting legislation from leading newspa-
pers throughout the country. Several of these editorials noted the possibility of some adverse
economic effect but expressed scepticism about any large trade diversion.
" 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 156-161.
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ation and behavior under which probabilistic judgments must be
made, such as the profit motive for business firms.
In these typical legislative settings, predictions must be made
about a general behavioral response among a large number of per-
sons or firms- potential lawbreakers among the general public,
manufacturing firms and so on. Will all or most or some individuals
be dissuaded from criminal conduct, or will corporations revise
technology when subject to a charge on pollutants? Experts may
testify about the likely effects of the law. But no one prediction and
no one assertion of an intended reaction will be taken as authorita-
tive or decisive. No one person or firm or cohesive group has the
power to determine, and thus authoritatively to predict, the general
response to proposed legislation. That power is spread among many
unrelated social actors.
Note the contrasting structure for prediction in the setting of the
boycott. One critical group of actors figures in the debates: the Arab
governments. Although that "group" was not before the Congress
and not subject to the proposed legislation, its reaction could deter-
mine the legislation's effects. The Arab governments made their
views known through diplomatic channels, and through occasional
public comments of officials or spokesmen-such as comments
threatening trade diversion which issued from the Central Boycott
Office of the Arab League.40
In this sense, the legislative setting assumed some of the character
of bilateral negotiations. Two groups or institutions-Arab govern-
ments and the Congress-were involved in an indirect form of dis-
course or bargaining. The "parties" were obviously attentive to each
other's words and actions.
Within this bilateral structure, statements of intended reaction
inevitably served an instrumental purpose. Predictions of trade di-
versions assumed the character of threat. The threat sought to im-
press upon the Congress its responsibility for loss of trade if restric-
tive legislation were enacted.4' It had a similar purpose to the use
Reports of reactions of Arab officials to the anti-boycott bills, including suggestions by
them that stringent measures might lead to some substitution of European or Japanese
markets for American markets, appeared in the press. See, e.g., Christian Science Monitor,
Jan. 7, 1976, at 5, col. 1; id., Jan. 6, 1976, at 3, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1976, § D, at 11,
col. 1; id., Apr. 12, 1976, at 7, col. 1; Wall St. J., June 25, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
" T. SCHELNG, THE STRATEGY OF CONFUCT (1960), develops a model in chapters II and V
of bargaining in which parties interpret each other's moves and "in which each party is guided
mainly by his expectations of what the other will accept." Id. at 21. The author distinguishes
among various strategies, such as a party's use of bluff or making of a firm commitment to
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of public commitments or threats by domestic groups, small in
number but large in economic power, which are the targets and
opponents of proposed regulation.42 That is, this "bilateral" struc-
ture of discourse and bargaining can characterize entirely domestic
legislative battles.
Congress could not sensibly take such statements at face value.
They had to be perceived as strategic, as a bargaining weapon.
Indeed, the public statements reported in the press or in the legisla-
tive record hardly amounted to an Arab commitment to divert trade
to countries which had not legislated against the boycott. 3 Such
statements appeared in a somewhat random manner. They issued
from persons at different levels of authority, and from several but
not all Arab countries. The statements themselves were sometimes
qualified.
These facts hardly surprise. An explicit and unqualified threat to
reallocate billions of dollars of trade if legislation touched the sec-
ondary boycott would have been astonishing-risky in terms of the
reaction it would induce, engaging national honor, expending politi-
cal capital. Arab reactions were ultimately affected by the terms of
the legislation. Firm threats could hardly have been shaped to meet
every possible contingency.
Moreover, a full acceptance of the extreme Arab assertions did
not fit with recent history. In assessing the degree of risk present,
Congress was entitled to take into account objective historical fac-
tors, some of which were extrinsic to the boycott problem. For exam-
ple, Arab governments in the past had blinked at boycott violations
when it was in their interest to do so." Neither Arabs nor Israelis
contended that the boycott had, or was likely to have, a serious
influence upon Middle East power politics. Moreover, it was diffi-
action. Commitment shades into threat, which is "designed to impress on the other the
automatic consequence of his act." Id. at 35. "While the commitment fixes one's course of
action, the threat fixes a course of reaction, of response to the other player." Id. at 124. Such
game or bargaining theory has some suggestiveness for the different, legislative context of the
boycott problem.
42 See, e.g., Greco, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from
Congress, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL AFF. 384 (1971), for an account of legislative battles in which
leading manufacturers asserted that they could not meet proposed automobile emission stan-
dards, and that lower production and fewer jobs would follow from legislation. Compare
threats of union members that they would not comply with a Taft-Hartley injunction under
consideration by the President. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1978, §A at 1, col. 3.
'3 See note 40 supra.
For examples, see Stern, On and Off the Arabs' List, NEw REPUBSLc, Mar. 27, 1976, at 7,
9, 10; Guzzardi, That Curious Barrier on the Arab Frontiers, FORTUNE, July 1975, at 82, 168.
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cult to believe that any but the most uncompromising statute, one
attacking the primary as well as secondary boycott, would have
induced drastic action when Arab governments had long accepted
this country's military and economic support of Israel. The political
and economic interdependence between many Arab countries and
the United States, rather than an imagined one-way dependence of
this country on petrodollars and oil, offered further assurance
against severe readjustments.
In a sense, business spokesmen stood before the Congress as repre-
sentatives of the Arab world, absorbing its threats of trade diversion
and converting them into business' firm predictions. As a conse-
quence, the Arab governments never were required to go on the line
about their reactions. Business did so for them.
It was indeed in business' interest to take the Arab statements at
face value, and to employ them to forestall legislation. Such a strat-
egy minimized any risk of loss of export sales. If it succeeded in
blocking legislation, business continued as usual. If not, firms would
at least be able to prove their adamant opposition to legislation. In
this sense, the harsh prophecies may have served instrumental pur-
poses not only towards Congress but towards Arab countries as well.
3. Other Grounds for Opposition
The opponents did not speak solely to trade losses. Other themes
appeared. For example, the argument was advanced that fairness
should lead this country to refrain from regulation, since our boycott
policies imposed on others just as the Arab boycott imposed upon
our territory. Evenhandedness pointed towards our acceptance of
that imposition." Statutory regulation should not go beyond inter-
nal religious discrimination.
This argument, as I have tried elsewhere to demonstrate, had a
certain plausibility. But it ignored distinctions between our basic
boycotts and the Arab secondary boycott. Moreover, it tended to
confuse the legality of a boycott with a seeming duty of a third
country to acquiesce in its extraterritorial reach. 7
See, e.g., Bingham Hearings, supra note 16, at 100, 105, 134-35, 223-30; comments of
Vice-President Rockefeller appearing in San Francisco Jewish Bull., May 14, 1976, at 1, 15;
comments of Secretary of Treasury Simon in Statements Before the House Comm. on Inter-
national Relations, in Dep't of Treasury News Release, June 9, 1976, at 5; statement of
William Needham, vice president of Black & Veatch International, Inc., in 1977 Senate
Hearings, supra note 14, at 77.
Steiner, supra note 11, at 1396-97.
' Id. at 1397-1402.
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Still the argument of reciprocity influenced the final legislation,
by making Congressmen more sensitive to the proper extraterrito-
rial reach of our response to the secondary boycott. Both the Admin-
istration and Congress came to distinguish sharply between the pri-
mary and secondary boycotts, as well as between conduct related to
the secondary boycott which was dominantly within this or within
a foreign country.18 Such distinctions were vital in formulating the
exceptions which figure in the present regulatory scheme.49
Finally, some business spokesmen raised the underlying question
of the proper directions for this country's Middle Eastern policy. At
its bluntest, that theme led to assertions that antiboycott legislation
would be seen by Arabs as but "another indication" of the
"imbalance" of our foreign policy 0 The battles over this legislation
inevitably raised the larger issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
occasional surfacing of such issues suggested the degree to which
general attitudes towards Israel may have moulded many legisla-
tors' positions from the start.
IV. EXECUTIVE POLICY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Prior to 1975, executive departments made at best a formal bow
to the antiboycott statement of policy passed by Congress a decade
earlier and restated in section 3(5) of the Export Administration Act
of 1969. 5' That section was predictably of pale interest to business
firms. But it did not even serve to block the Commerce Depart-
ment's distribution to American firms of trade bids from Arab coun-
tries which included boycott-related requirements. Indeed the De-
partment added its advice that firms were not "legally" barred by
section 3(5) from compliance with those requirements. 2 If the Gov-
ernment treated an official policy statement so casually, firms were
unlikely to do otherwise.
" See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. S7147 (daily ed. May 5, 1977)(comments of Senator Stevenson);
id. at S7149 (comments of Senator Heinz); 1977 Senate Report, supra note 24, at 21; 1977
Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 427-39 (comments of Secretary of State Vance).
" See, e.g., the description of the essential provisions in 43 Fed. Reg. 3508-12 (1978).
w Statement of William Needham, supra note 45, at 78.
" Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3(5), 83 Stat. 841 (1969)(expired Sept. 1976). Section 3(5) stated
that it was this country's policy "to oppose ... boycotts ... imposed by foreign countries
against other countries friendly to the United States, and . . . to encourage . . . domestic
[export] concerns . . . to refuse to take any action, including the furnishing of information
or the signing of agreements, which has the effect of furthering or supporting [such] boycotts
52 See Moss Hearings, supra note 16, at 38-40, 154-56.
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The underwriting episodes in 1975 in Europe and this country to
which I earlier referred,5 3 as well as fears of a more potent boycott
because of accumulating petrodollars, led to greater pressure upon
President Ford from Congress and the Jewish agencies. The Presi-
dent took or ordered remedial action with respect to explicit govern-
mental complicity in the boycott and the risk of internal religious
discrimination. 4 But federal policy stopped short of prohibiting
compliance with the secondary boycott.
Acute differences between Congress and executive spokesmen
characterized the period 1975-1976. As sentiment in the 94th Con-
gress moved towards strong legislation, the executive departments
concerned with foreign affairs or commerce viewed the leading bills
as something between an embarrassment and a menace. In a general
sense, their position reflected the traditional executive view that
delicate foreign affairs issues are best left to the Executive. Con-
gress, whether swayed by domestic interest groups or noble aspira-
tions, is more apt to muddle than to achieve a sensible solution.
Foreign policy requires coherence in planning and subtlety in execu-
tion. A new statute, attended by headlines and acerbic rhetoric,
would be exactly the wrong path.
In the immediate context, antiboycott legislation was said to bur-
den our Middle Eastern policy. Part of the larger Arab-Israeli con-
flict, the boycott was not a subject fit for special regulation. The
hostility of Arabs that was certain to be spurred by strict legislation
would frustrate diplomatic initiatives to alleviate the boycott. It
would also impair our ability to persuade the contending nations
towards a larger settlement.55
Petrodollars loomed large before the executive spokesmen. Bil-
lions of dollars of Arab trade and hundreds of thousands of jobs were
there to be gained-or, it was repeatedly said, lost. 6 The stock
' See note 17 supra.
11 See President's Statement on Foreign Boycott Practices of Nov. 20, 1975, 11 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1305-1306 (Nov. 24; 1975).
For testimony or statements of executive officials which advanced these arguments, see
Stevenson Hearings, supra note 16, at 2-9, 19-23, 48-50, 70-80; Bingham Hearings, supra note
16, at 71-86, 94-103, 118-121.
m Secretary of Commerce Morton expressed the administration view that Arabs were not
dependent upon the United States for goods or services and could turn to other markets. If
legislation barred boycott compliance by United States firms, "[miost of the judgments we
have in the Department would indicate that we would lose the business." Moss Hearings,
supra note 16, at 24. Under Secretary of Commerce Baker stressed that annual Arab trade
with the United States was estimated to exceed $10 billion by 1980, and that each billion
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market, the specialized markets for government debt securities, and
stability of the dollar would be threatened if there were a retaliatory
withdrawal of Arab capital, or a shift from Arab holdings of dollar
reserves to other currencies.
This reluctance to forbid compliance with the secondary boycott,
coupled with a recognition of the need to strengthen antidiscrimi-
nation and reporting measures, constituted the Ford Administra-
tion's boycott policy until its end. Executive officials asserted that
all problems could be met through administrative regulations under
existing statutes, through adjudication under the antitrust laws
and, most importantly, through quiet diplomacy. It followed that
the Administration opposed the two leading candidates for general
antiboycott legislation, the Stevenson and Bingham-Rosenthal
bills. Surely the Administration was complicit in the manuevers in
the closing days of the 94th Congress by which the convening of a
conference committee, the path towards a resolution of differences
between the Senate and House bills, was blocked.57
In one sense, the Ford Administration succeeded in its goal of
avoiding affront to the Arab governments. It forestalled legislation.
But in fact its strategy towards Congress was strikingly inept. The
officials of the Commerce,- State and Treasury Departments simply
failed to sense the breadth and intensity of congressional support for
some action-whether that support stemmed from effective lobby-
ing by the Jewish agencies, from general sympathy towards Israel,
or from the independent power of the arguments for legislation.
Had the Administration perceived the inevitable trend, it would
have been wise to have extended support to a weak form of regula-
tion. The Stevenson bill, for example, was not apt to disturb foreign
policy. Such a position might have won the support of many in
Congress who wished to do something, but not to risk political fric-
tion or loss of trade.
The Administration's unyielding hostility to any measures reach-
ing beyond religious discrimination served instead to polarize the
political process. The choice perceived by many Congressmen was
dollars of exports was thought to create 40,000-70,000 jobs. Bingham Hearings, supra note
16, at 120.
" Several senators blocked the appointment of Senate conferees to meet with House confer-
ees. To advocates of the antiboycott bills, the link between such senators and the administra-
tion was obvious. See 122 CONG. REC. S17594-95 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976)(comments of Senator
Proxmire); id. at S17595 (comments of Senator Stevenson); and id. at H12313 (comments of
Representative Bingham).
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"all or nothing." In the House they opted for "all" by voting 318-63
for the Bingham-Rosenthal bill." Indeed, the "phantom" confer-
ence committee, that met after a formal convening of the committee
was blocked, did produce a "conference" bill that was very close to
the Bingham-Rosenthal bill.59 The stage was set for strong action by
the next Congress.
Not until the electoral campaign was underway did President
Ford's position appear to change. Campaign pressures, intensified
by Carter's effective use of the boycott issue with Jewish groups,
worked their influence. During a televised Carter-Ford debate, the
President declared his commitment to legislation "which would
take strong and effective action against those who participate or
cooperate with the Arab boycott.""0 Friends and foes of the legisla-
tive proposals were equally astounded.
Carter, confronting doubt within the American Jewish com-
munity about his empathy for Jewish concerns or Israeli problems,
gave the boycott issue a certain prominence in his campaign. He
attacked the Ford Administration's attitude and promised strict
legislation.6 In so doing, Carter emphasized the issue of internal
religious discrimination.2 That issue was attractive. It aroused
strong emotions and spoke to shared moral concerns. Promising
action to counter religious discrimination was likely to irritate few.
Of course in this respect Carter simply adopted the precampaign
approach of the Ford Administration.
122 CONG. REC. H10864 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
s' The revised bill as approved by conferees at their informal meeting was introduced into
the Congressional Record by Representative Bingham. 122 CONG. REC. H12313-15 (daily ed.
Oct. 1, 1976).
" N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1976, §A, at 38, col. 1.
11 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1976, § A, at 19, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1976, at 28,
col. 1.
62 In the second Carter-Ford debate on October 6, 1976, Carter said he would "do every-
thing I can as President to stop the boycott . . . .It's not a matter of diplomacy or trade
with me. It's a matter of morality . . . .When we have a strong President who will protect
the integrity of our Constitution and Bill of Rights and protect people in this country who
happen to be Jews-it may later be Catholics; it may later be Baptists who are threatened
by a foreign country, but we ought to stand staunch." Referring to the boycott of businesses
"because they have American Jews as owners or directors," Carter stated that this was the
first occasion in our history "where we've let a foreign country circumvent or change our Bill
of Rights." N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1976, at 36, col. 1. This emphasis remained to the end. Upon
signing the antiboycott legislation, the President said that it did not threaten the sovereign
right of any foreign nation to control its own commerce. "The bill seeks instead to end the
divisive effects on American life of foreign boycotts aimed at Jewish members of our society."
13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 898 (June 27, 1977).
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But an important change had occurred. Carter was committed to
some type of legislation. Whether that legislation would tend to-
wards the Senate (weak) or House (strong) bills of the 94th Congress
remained ambiguous, although some assurances given by Carter
pointed towards curbs on the secondary boycott. But the issues and
assurances were blurred.
Whatever its attractiveness as a campaign strategy, the stress
upon religious discrimination and the corresponding downplay of
other vexing questions about the secondary boycott had their seri-
ous consequences. As the cautious content of the Carter Administra-
tion's program became known early in 1977, charges of the compro-
mise of earlier commitments were bound to and did arise.
That program stopped far shy of measures like the Bingham-
Rosenthal bill. It was as if Carter as President first realized the
complexity of these issues. Evidently pressures were felt within the
White House both from business interests and Arab governments.
The Secretary of State's early tour of Arab capitals had its influ-
ence. All these pressures heightened the Administration's sensitiv-
ity to legislation's potential influence upon Middle Eastern oil poli-
tics, petrodollar investment in United States securities, and petro-
dollar trade. The bold assurances of the campaign became the
muted commitments of early 1977.
In part the direction of the Administration was traceable to the
new vigor of and the positions struck by the leading interest groups.
As long as the Ford Administration had been using its political
capital to attack all serious proposals before Congress, business in-
terests apparently concluded that there was no need to mobilize.
But Carter's campaign and election, seen against the bill which had
almost passed the 94th Congress, signified that business could no
longer remain at an observer's distance. Obviously something would
happen. Business would now seek to influence just what did.
As a consequence, some business associations moved from dog-
matic opposition to any statute towards advocacy of limited regula-
tion, and thereby became a more effective force and influence upon
Administration strategy. By contrast, the Jewish agencies.that had
been so close to celebrating enactment of the Bingham-Rosenthal
bill were content to wait and see how the.Carter Administration
honored its campaign commitments. They saw no political need to
retreat from advocating a strong 1976-style bill.
Secretary of State Vance and other executive officials developed
the new program in testimony early in 1977 before congressional
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committees. It amounted to a guarded attack upon the secondary
boycott. 3 Such boycotts could use this country's commerce "to
harm third countries with whom we are friends." 4 Through
executive-congressional cooperation, "we can make progress on
these issues without seriously impairing opportunities for foreign
trade or inhibiting our diplomacy in the Middle East. . .. "I The
legislation had to be scrupulously drawn, to guard against overreach
and undue offence to Arab sensibilities. Although Arab govern-
ments would not be "happy" with it, a statute along the lines devel-
oped by Vance "would be understood" by them.66 An explanation
"emphasizing that U.S. legislation deals-as is entirely appropri-
ate-with U.S. commerce and the activities of U.S. persons will be
understood by Arab leaders." 7 Such remarks, following the Middle
Eastern trip of the Secretary, suggested that this government was
at last using diplomacy to justify some form of antiboycott legisla-
tion to leading Arab governments. The effectiveness of this diplo-
macy was evidenced by such governments' grudging concessions
during this period-for example, their willingness to dispense with
a "negative" certificate of origin on imported goods, and to accept
the normal affirmative certificate to enforce their primary boycott.
The proposal put to the Congress by Vance and Secretary of Com-
merce Kreps was for a new direction-a via media-a fresh statute
drafted by the Executive and congressional committees that would
distinguish between primary and secondary boycotts and regulate
the latter, but only selectively18 Because of their blurring of this
distinction and their blanket prohibition of any compliance with the
secondary boycott, the strong bills then before both Senate and
House were, in Vance's view, "unhelpful" to peace efforts." They
could adversely affect oil prices, trade and petrodollar investment.
But it was made clear to Vance that discussion would have to
proceed within the framework of those strong bills.10 The commit-
- Relevant testimony and a prepared statement of Secretary Vance are set forth in 1977
House Hearings, supra note 14, at 4-32. A prepared statement of and letter from Secretary of
Commerce Kreps are set forth in id. at 230, 319. Secretary Vance's testimony on the Senate
side of these matters appears in 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 427-42.
" 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 427.
" 1977 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 4.
" Id. at 32.
11 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 429.
" 1977 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 319; 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 437.
6 197i S.nate Hearings, supra note 14, at.438-39.
,o See Maslew, note 13 supra, at 11, 22.
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tees would not start fresh with the new Administration as partner.
Given this barrier to its preferred approach, the Administration
urged the writing into the pending bills of provisions which business
interests were then advocating: broad exceptions for unilateral
selection of goods or services, and for local compliance with host-
country laws; limited extraterritorial reach; preemption with re-
spect to state laws; limited reporting.7
The Administration's advocacy of these changes signified the for-
mation of a powerful coalition to tame the legislative proposals in-
herited from the 94th Congress. Our foreign affairs and commerce
agencies together with "responsible" business spokesmen were more
or less united. A major battle was pending. Fearing the threat of
such a battle within Congress and before the public between the
Jewish agencies and business leaders, a battle into which the Presi-
dent might well be drawn, the White House searched for a quieter
path towards resolving the differences. It put its weight behind pri-
vate negotiations between the Business Roundtable and the three
Jewish agencies. The Business Roundtable would stand informally
as a surrogate for the executive departments. It would speak with
the support of the White House, which itself could remain conven-
iently quiet.
This post-campaign strategy of President Carter was an impor-
tant force in his achieving legislation more moderate than that be-
fore the 94th Congress. Adherence to the Executive's earlier dog-
matic opposition might have led to a tougher statute. The paradox
was that only a willingness to accept some restraints on the second-
ary boycott enabled the Administration to weaken the bills before
the Congress.
One also senses that only its awareness of the powerful congres-
sional base for legislation explains the Administration's support for
curbs on participation in the secondary boycott. Its basic concerns
were elsewhere, with foreign policy, oil and trade. That President
Carter would have risked setbacks on such matters by urging a
strong statute to satisfy claims of the American Jewish community
appears doubtful. As with Ford, the prudent path was to speak
vigorously to the moral issues and to act to the minimum necessary.
But, its hand now forced by Congress, the Administration joined
the fight together with business for important exceptions and limits
to the bills. That strategy succeeded on various grounds. Most im-
11 1977 House Hearings, supra note 14, at 319.
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portant, it demonstrated to Arabs a certain evenhandedness in pol-
icy. The present law meets the full demands of neither Jewish
groups nor multinational corporations. Moreover, we have seen that
it can be viewed, both in its restraints and in its exceptions, as ex-
pressing the two basic principles. And those principles can be
viewed as transcending the immediate interests of the contending
parties. To that extent, the antiboycott legislation need not bear a
pro-Israel or anti-Arab message. It sheds some of its politically
divisive character.
V. BARGAINING BETWEEN PRIVATE INTEREST GROUPS
Numerous business associations ranging from petroleum-
equipment exporters to the Chamber of Commerce testified before
the Congress. Their hostility towards any regulation and their exag-
geration of risks of trade loss diminished their effectiveness. At the
same time another business association that had made only brief
and low-key appearances before Congress powerfully influenced the
legislation.
The Business Roundtable, formed in 1972 to "develop positions
that reflect sound economic and social principles, 7 2 consists of the
chief executives of about 180 companies which figure among the
nation's 500 largest. Its access to and influence upon the White
House has been on the rise, partly because its membership includes
executives known by the President." Expressing opinions, and often
consulted, on legislative matters affecting business such as
consumer-protection legislation, the Business Roundtable has been
effective in developing, publicizing, and gaining support for posi-
tions acceptable to its constituents.
Carter's campaign assurances, coupled with the strong bills that
were certain to re-emerge in the 95th Congress, meant that legisla-
tion was inevitable. Responding to this political reality, the Busi-
ness Roundtable formed a task force in January 1977 to consider the
antiboycott bills. It initially invited the Anti-Defamation League to
form a similar committee for joint meetings. Eventually the three
Jewish agencies joined in this arrangement.
" "Foreign Boycott Regulations"-Submission of the Business Roundtable Task Force to
the U.S. Department of Commerce in Connection with Implementation of Title H1 of the
Export Administration Amendments of 1977, July 18, 1977, at i.
7" For a recent account of the growing influence upon the President of certain interest
groups, including the Business Roundtable, see Clymer, Like Carter, Potomic Power is
Ambiguous, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1978, §12, at 26, col. 1.
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A group of lawyers from the Business Roundtable and the agen-
cies together wrote a set of principles to guide the Congress. ' Stated
at a general level, these principles led to only transient agreement
between the two groups. The Jewish agencies sought to construe
narrowly those portions covering exceptions to prohibi-
tions-particularly exceptions involving unilateral selection of
goods and compliance with local laws-and to construe broadly the
provisions for extraterritorial reach to foreign subsidiaries. The
Business Roundtable naturally went in the opposite direction.7 5 The
groups fell apart.
Under public and persistent encouragement from the White
House and Congressmen, the two groups resumed negotiations.
Eventually they agreed upon a draft of amendments to a pending
bill which covered these contentious matters." Those amendments
of course relaxed the categorical prohibitions of the earlier bills.
Where the two groups still differed, vague terms were used. Each
group could hope that the statutory language would be interpreted
in its favor in the regulations to be issued by the Commerce Depart-
ment.
In these negotiations and in its public remarks, the Business
Roundtable appeared to stand for the "responsible" middle posi-
tion. In fact, its views moved during the negotiations towards fur-
ther recognition of the Jewish agencies' concerns. That move and
the public sense of the Business Roundtable as a "responsible"
group encouraged the Jewish agencies towards a compromise.
For several reasons, compromise came to make more sense to the
Jewish agencies than an outright battle in Congress. Just where the
lines were drawn on the exceptions or other statutory terms, had had
an evident significance, but not of a cosmic order. Many crucial
points had been won since 1975. To fight to push the lines back to
those of the earlier bills might have expended a political capital
with the Carter Administration, Congress, and big business that
was better reserved for more serious matters. Moreover, the fight
11 The Joint Statement of Principles re Foreign Boycott Legislation is set forth in 1977
Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 476.
"' See letter from Irving Shapiro, chairman of the Business Roundtable, to Chairman
Zablocki of the House Comm. on International Relations (Mar. 10, 1977) reprinted in 1977
House Hearings, supra note 14, at 328.
11 Commenting on the draft, President Carter stated: "I am pleased to announce that an
agreement has been reached . . . on legislative language for the anti-foreign boycott bill
presently being considered by the Senate, and that I can strongly recommend congressional
approval of that language." 13 WEEKLY CoMP. oF PREs. Doc. 650 (May 19, 1977).
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might well have been lost. No longer was Congress given an "all or
nothing" choice. The Administration and the Business Roundtable
pointed towards the reasonable-the via media.
It was not unusual for private interest groups to compose their
differences and submit joint legislative proposals. It was at least
unusual for the President and Congressmen to urge such efforts. It
was remarkable that the amendments drafted by the two groups
were adopted verbatim by the Congress, indeed by a 90-1 vote when
introduced on the floor of the Senate. 77
It is easy to see in this innovative bargaining a reflection and
strengthening of the trend towards more structured interest-group
politics. It is also possible to see a hint of increased governmental
delegation to private groups of the task of reaching agreement on
legislative programs that would then be enacted by Congress.78
Such delegation would amount to a trend towards mixed private-
public lawmaking that combined elements of traditional democratic
and of corporative structures of government. It would express a
more formal, official recognition of the claims and powers of interest
11 123 CONG. REc. S7189 (daily ed. May 5, 1977). The final House vote on the bill was 306-
41, with 86 not voting. 123 CONG. REC. H5706 (daily ed. June 10, 1977). In the Senate floor
debate at the time of adoption of the amendments, a number of senators stated that they
would have preferred a stricter law. Senator Bayh, after expressing that view, noted that the
Jewish agencies and the Business Roundtable had "developed a common position on poten-
tially divisive issues." Id. at S7188. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 20, 1977, at 64, stated
that "observers could recall no previous instance of Congress and the White House openly
inviting such outsiders, in effect, to write their own statute."
A vigorous political process continued through the six-month period during which the
preliminary and formal regulations appeared. The Business Roundtable, Jewish agencies,
and numerous other groups filed suggestions and criticisms with the Department of Com-
merce in response to the preliminary regulations. Congressmen themselves expressed their
keen interest and views to the Department. See Hearings on Department of Commerce's
Proposed Anti-Boycott Enforcement and Regulation Plans Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and the letters reproduced
therein at 89-100 to the Secretary of Commerce from a number of Senators and Representa-
tives. Ultimately the Jewish agencies, although noting some disappointments and issuing
some caveats about enforcement, could express "satisfaction with the thrust" of the regula-
tions. AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, 2 BOYCOTT REPORT No. 2, at 2 (1978). And the chairman
of the Business Roundtable could express the general business reaction as: "I can live with
it." Id.
11 In his remarks at the time of signing the antiboycott legislation, President Carter compli-
mented the members of Congress whose "hard work" was so important to the legislation. He
added: "And it owes just as much to the patient perseverance of the Business Roundtable,
the [three Jewish agencies], as well as other groups . . . .This cooperative effort between
the business community, the Jewish leaders, the Congress, and the executive branch can
serve as a model for what can be accomplished in even more difficult areas, when reasonable
people agree to sit down together in good will and good faith." 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 898-99 (June 27, 1977).
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groups than has been customary during these recent decades of
pluralist politics. It would rest partly on the assumption that the
public welfare is best attained through the compromises reached
outside the halls of Congress by the private interests involved. Con-
gress would simply touch the outcome of private bargaining with the
wand of public authority. The model of the labor contract would
expand through this informal pattern of delegation to embrace
larger areas of political life.
The negotiated agreements between the Business Roundtable and
the Jewish agencies and their ratification by Congress may indeed
serve as a model for other informal delegations of the "legislative"
power. But the context in which this bargaining occurred suggests
a more conservative interpretation. Antiboycott bills had been be-
fore the Congress for several years. It was unmistakable as the 95th
Congress convened that some form of strong rather than nominal
bill would pass. The questions open-the exceptions and extent of
extraterritorial reach-were important in themselves. But the pre-
cise line of compromise over them was of marginal significance in
relation to the undeniable achievements of the statute as a whole.
It was in this structured setting, one in which the critical legisla-
tive decisions had been taken, that Congress and the White House
sought a less public path towards the final line-drawing. An obvious
and basic difference exists between such a sequence of events and
an invitation from government to contesting groups to plan from the
start and to draft a bill which government would then convert into
law.
VI. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
The new law takes a large and necessary step towards checking
secondary boycotts. Some check there had to be, for the inner logic
of the Arab boycott suggested no stopping point. Quite naturally,
the secondary boycott will tend to expand its coverage and increase
its effectiveness where national opposition is muted. It will stop at,
and not before, a firm legal barrier.
The alternative to such legislation for the United States was to
act only against the religious discrimination upon which this boy-
cott will always border, and to acquiesce in our absorbing a system-
atic pattern of trade discrimination. This was not an acceptable
alternative. Among other consequences for self-respect or national
well being, it would have confirmed the deepest fears of the Ameri-
can Jewish community that oil governs, and that concerns of Ameri-
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can Jews, as well as Israel's integrity, would be surrendered to petro-
dollar politics.
The legislation responds to the critical arguments based on the
principles of non-discrimination and territorial sovereignty. It does
so without the exacerbation which had been forecast. In part, this
was so because the disputants came to see each other's legitimate
concerns. In part, both advocates and opponents could come to see
the principle of territorial sovereignty as a mediating or common
principle above all disputants, at once justifying legislative restric-
tions and pointing towards their boundaries.
The regulatory scheme now draws basically a territorial line in
prohibiting such domestic conduct as religious discrimination, the
supply of information, or discriminatory commercial decisions re-
sponsive to the boycott. The exceptions and the limits on extraterri-
torial reach permit substantial boycott-directed conduct of United
States subsidiaries abroad, such as their agreement to comply with
the boycott with respect to their foreign production or conduct, or
with respect to their imports into Arab countries for their own use.79
Occasionally these territorial lines are blurred. The prohibitions
reach foreign subsidiaries of American firms on transactions bearing
defined relationships to the United States.'" On the other hand,
domestic firms can supply affirmative certificates of origin that will
be used for boycott purposes, and can comply with the unilateral
selection by a purchaser in an Arab country of, for example, trade-
marked components of products, even if aware that the selection
was responsive to the boycott.' To that limited degree, the extended
secondary (tertiary) boycott continues to be administered by Ameri-
can firms on American territory as they contract with other Ameri-
can suppliers within foreign unilateral selections.
The effect of the legislation upon the prosecution of the boycott
remains problematic. Of course the primary boycott will continue
as long as Arab countries so desire. No American legislation could
effectively curb it, or indeed should seek to. Moreover, there are
inherent limits to legislation's ability to contain the secondary boy-
cott. Even the strong Bingham-Rosenthal bill of the 94th Congress
confronted these limits. Arab governments can continue to main-
tain blacklists and select American firms as their pocketbook or
7' EAR §§ 369.1(d) and 369.3 (f-2), 43 Fed. Reg. 3514, 3533 (1978).
See, e.g., EAR § 369.1(d)(8,9), 43 Fed. Reg. 3514 (1978).
" EAR § 369.3(c), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526-30 (1978).
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politics may recommend.
What the legislation achieves is more modest. It erases, or in some
respects only dulls, the secondary boycott's mark on our domestic
life. It should end the explicit absorption of American business into
the boycott's administration. But here too there are limits. Informal
cooperation by American firms, principally the large multinationals
to which the statutory exceptions and limits are particularly rele-
vant, will be difficult to detect and regulate. The integrity and
techniques of enforcement by the Commerce Department will be of
importance-including the meaning and application given the legis-
lation's evasion clause.8 2
That the legislation will seriously disturb Arab trade with the
United States appears doubtful. Effective diplomacy and the statu-
tory exceptions sharply reduced whatever risk there may have been
of large readjustments of Arab purchases.
In any event, the causal influences upon trading patterns are so
difficult to unravel that a precise determination of the legislation's
influence is unlikely. Changing trade or investment will reflect the
influence of factors as varied as inflationary price rises, interest
rates and stock market performance, views about a given currency's
strength, or the desire to concentrate or diversify purchases for gen-
eral political reasons. To the present, such information about Arab
trade or investment as has been made public suggests at most a
mild impact of the legislation."3
Nor is the legislation likely to influence Middle Eastern political
issues. Within the larger picture, the boycott represents a minor
scene. It is more reflection than cause of political tensions. What-
ever its economic effectiveness, it will doubtless survive in some
form as long as Israel and the Arab countries see themselves as
antagonists. It will fade as prospects for peace brighten, and disap-
pear into a general settlement. Let us hope for the day!
0 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(6).
In Curry, Anti-Boycott Laws Unlikely to Affect Mideast Trade Greatly, Wash. Post, Jan.
18, 1978, § C, at 7, cols. 1-5, sources in government and industry are reported as stating that
"no one expects any significant impact on the billions of dollars" of Mideast trade. A Com-
merce Department "expert" is quoted as stating that "a number of [Arab] countries have
indicated they will accept such arrangements." The article notes some indications of lost sales
that may be boycott-related. A report in the Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1977, at 6, col. 3, stated
that Iraq had retaliated against the antiboycott legislation by advising its state trading
agencies to avoid United States products if suitable products were available elsewhere. An
article by Crittenden, Arabs' Investments in US. Slackening, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1977, at
1, col. 6, analyzes a number of factors relevant to the decline, such as stock prices or interest
rates and weakness of the dollar, but does not mention antiboycott legislation.
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